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Abstract
This paper analyses alternative monetary policy rules for the ECB, using
a two "country" model of the euro area and the US, that assumes monopo-
listic competition, sticky prices and optimizing agents. The alternative rules
analyzed for the ECB are ranked by their ability to stabilize consumption, out-
put, and inﬂation and maximize consumers’ welfare. The analysis contributes
toward understanding the trade-oﬀs faced by policymakers in open economies
and provides some support for the current design of the ECB’s operational
framework. The results suggest that stabilizing money-growth, in addition to
inﬂation, gives an additional degree of freedom to stabilize output. Although
price stability is likely to remain the primary objective of the ECB, mone-
tary policy must “without prejudice of price stability (...) support the general
economic policies in the Community...” (Article 2). Hence monitoring money,
under certain assumptions about the shocks hitting the economy, may deliver
a better outcome in terms of output stabilization which should allow the ECB
to fulﬁll its secondary but nonetheless important commitment.
JEL classiﬁcation: F41, F42, E58, E31
Keywords: European Central Bank (ECB), monetary policy rules, stabiliza-
tion, new open economy macroeconomics.
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The Maastricht Treaty has ﬁrmly established that the “primary objective of the Eu-
ropean Central Bank (ECB) shall be to maintain price stability” [but] “...without
prejudice of price stability it shall support the general economic policies in the Com-
munity...” (Article 2). In order to achieve this objective the ECB has adopted a
two pillar strategy consisting of, under the ﬁrst-pillar, a reference value for money
growth, and under the second-pillar a wide range analysis of economic and ﬁnancial
indicators that may contain information about prices. This strategy of the ECB has
been criticized on the grounds that its parallel focus on monetary as well as price
developments renders it opaque and confusing to market participants. Instead, the
critics have argued, a policy focused on a single intermediate (either in the form of an
inﬂation or money growth) target, under a uniﬁed framework or pillar, would improve
the eﬀectiveness and communication of monetary policy in the euro area.
From a theoretical viewpoint, the question of interest is whether such a framework
can be welfare maximizing for the "representative" euro-area citizen. In order to
address this issue this paper revisits a distinction, which dates back to Poole (1970),
between “pure” (or single) target policies, and “combination” policies. A combination
policy implies, for example, that the Central Bank targets a weighted average of two
or more intermediate targets.1 Based on this idea it examines whether, and under
what conditions, a combination policy — perhaps as practiced by the ECB — may
be welfare maximizing. The analysis is conducted within an open-economy model
with utility-optimizing agents, sticky prices (or wages), and monopolistic competition
(either in the product or the labor market). Price stickiness results in a sub-optimal,
from a welfare maximization viewpoint, outcome and calls for more active macro
stabilization policies (see Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ, 1995).2
A simple open-economy model is developed comprising of the euro area and the
US as the representative currency blocks. The ECB and the Federal Reserve System
(FED) are responsible for monetary policy in the euro area, and the US, respectively.
The model is similar, in spirit, to that of Corsetti and Pesenti (1999). However,
instead of introducing money in the utility function this paper uses a cash-in-advance
formulation in order to avoid having the nominal interest rate and the money growth
rate changing proportionally to one another. This characteristic, which is a feature of
the model by Corsetti and Pesenti (1999) model, would imply that the interest rate
1For simplicity, here as in Poole (1970) there will be no formal distinction between instruments
and targets.
2Examples of recent open economy models that combine short-run rigidities with monopolistic
competition are those by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996), Corsetti and Pesenti (1999), Ghironi (1998),
and Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1998).
1and monetary targeting alternatives are identical and hence it would not be desirable
for the purposes of this paper (see also Sargent, 1987, on this point). In addition, it
is assumed that, for credibility reasons, the ECB must commit to a pre-announced
monetary policy rule while the FED, having acquired reputation among the market
participants, may choose to “surprise” the market. Since, for simplicity, velocity is set
equal to unity the only disturbances in the euro-area’s monetary sector are, in eﬀect,
US money supply shocks. Other types of shocks, including ﬁscal shocks and shocks
to preferences, are also analyzed although it is shown that these are less interesting
cases.3
Three diﬀerent policies — money growth targeting, interest rate targeting and
inﬂation targeting — are compared in terms of their eﬀectiveness in mitigating the
external shock. These alternative policies are ranked according to their ability to
stabilize inﬂation and, alternatively, the utility of consumers. Utility stabilization in
this case will be the best that the monetary authority will be able to achieve in terms
of maximizing consumers’ welfare.4
Inﬂation targeting ranks (unsurprisingly) ﬁrst in its ability to stabilize inﬂation.
However, the ranking on the other two policies depends on the share of euro-area
imports in total trade. The higher this share, the less attractive—for inﬂation sta-
bilization purposes—interest rate targeting becomes (due to the stronger impact on
the exchange rate) in comparison to money growth targeting.5 However, in terms of
utility stabilization the ranking of policies depends on the relative weight of consump-
tion and leisure in the utility function. If the weight of consumption in the utility
function is one (and the weight of leisure is zero), then it is shown that interest rate
targeting is the best instrument to achieve utility stabilization. In contrast, if the
representative agent values only leisure, a money growth targeting rule (which results
in more output stabilization) is the preferred intermediate target for the purpose of
stabilizing utility. However, in the intermediate case in which consumers value both
consumption and leisure, a “combination” policy which takes into account the weight
3The cash-in advance formulation has the advantage of allowing for a closed form solution which,
like in Corsetti and Pesenti (1999), facilitates the analysis of the impact of large disturbances and
not only of small shocks, since it does not rely on log-linearization techniques. The assumption of
constant velocity is also a simpliﬁcation and could be relaxed following Woodford (1991).
4Shocks will be assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero. While “positive” shocks
improve welfare, “negative” shocks reduce it. The expected mean of these variations will be zero
but will be assumed that their variance has a cost. The policy loss function in this paper is in the
same spirit as the Lucas welfare measure, used by Collard, Dellas and Ertz (2000), which consists
of calculating how much consumption consumers would be willing to sacriﬁce to perfectly avoid any
utility ﬂuctuations.
5Uncovered interest parity holds in this model. Therefore, under a ﬁxed interest rate regime, the
exchange rate has to adjust fully to changes in the US interest rate.
2of both consumption and leisure (output) in the utility function, can stabilize welfare
optimally.6
Poole (1970) presented an analogous result for a central bank aiming at stabilizing
output in a closed economy. Monetary targeting was found, in that case, to be more
eﬀective in stabilizing shocks in the real sector, while interest rate targeting better for
stabilizing velocity shocks. He also showed that a “combination” policy - combining
interest rate and money growth targeting by taking into account the variance of the
diﬀerent types of disturbances - could outperform the other policies.7 In our open
economy model, the results also suggest that, under certain conditions, a “combi-
nation strategy” can be welfare improving. Since the paper considers three possible
targeting strategies, and only two targets are suﬃcient to stabilize consumers’ util-
ity, the “combination” policy can take the form of either money growth and interest
rate targeting, inﬂation and interest rate targeting, or, inﬂation and money growth
targeting. It is shown that, when policies are designed so as to produce the desirable
outcome in terms of consumption and leisure (output) variations, all of these three
choices can “insulate” welfare from the foreign money supply shocks.8 However, in
order to achieve this outcome, policymakers need to know the underlying parame-
ters of the model (e.g., the degree of risk aversion, the market power of workers, the
intertemporal discount rate, etc.) Consequently, when uncertainty is high regarding
these parameters, a poorly designed “combination” policy can exacerbate the eﬀect
of shocks on consumption and output. Interestingly, a policy combining the inﬂation
rate and the money growth rate does not require the knowledge of the parameter of
risk aversion to guarantee that welfare is stabilized successfully.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section two describes the
model and the solutions; section three compares money growth targeting, interest
rate targeting and inﬂation targeting in terms of inﬂation and welfare stabilization.
Section four analyses the “combination” strategies. Section ﬁve outlines the eﬀects
of other policy alternatives and shocks and section six concludes.
6In an open economy domestic consumption is a share of aggregate world output supply. There-
fore, for domestic consumption to remain stable foreign output changes must be oﬀset by domestic
output changes. This is the reason why there is a trade-oﬀ between keeping domestic output stable
and keeping consumption stable, when the economy is open.
7Collard, Harris and Dellas (2000) generalize Poole results to the case of a general equilibrium
model, still in a closed economy setup, and conclude that this policy trade-oﬀ disappears: nominal
interest rate targeting results in greater stability than money growth targeting independently of the
type of shock, generating also a higher level of welfare. In this analysis, however, the open economy
set-up restores a policy trade-oﬀ in terms of utility stabilization.
8This paper will show that this is possible for all three types of combinations, by ﬁnding a
relationship between the instruments which maintains utility stable at all times. For all three sets
of instruments considered, the “optimal” combination policies yield the same outcome for inﬂation.
32T h e M o d e l
The world is comprised of two economies, Europe (EU) and the United States (US).
As in Corsetti and Pesenti (1999), each economy in inhabited by an inﬁnitely lived
representative consumer, who decides how much to consume and work, and how many
cash-balances and assets to hold under perfect foresight. Each economy specializes
in the production of a speciﬁc basket of goods and the representative consumers
derive utility from consuming both European goods and US goods. The utility-based
consumption indexes of individual j in Europe, and individual j∗in the US, at time
t, can be written as follows:
CEU(j)t = CEU
eut (j))γ(CEU
ust (j))1−γ (1)
CUS(j∗)t = CUS
eut(j∗))γ(CUS
ust(j∗))1−γ
where CEU
eu and CEU
us are the amounts of European goods and US goods that are
consumed by individual j, in Europe, while CUS
eu and CUS
us are the amounts of the
home and the foreign goods, respectively, that are consumed by individual j∗,i nt h e
US. Starred parameters will refer to the US economy; subscripts denote the origin of
the variables (or their currency denomination, in the case of prices and cash-balances),
while superscripts denote the market where they are sold/transacted (or to which they
apply, in the case of price deﬂators). The parameter γ can be interpreted as the share
of the European goods in the world market, while (1 − γ) is the share of US goods.
Assuming that there is no market segmentation across countries, so that the law-of-
one-price holds, the consumption-based price indexes, PEU and PUS,d e ﬁned as the
minimum expenditure needed for acquiring one unit of the composite goods CEU and
CUSgiven the price of the European basket Peu denominated in euros, and the price
of US basket Pus denominated in dollars are given by the following expressions:
P EU
t =
1
γw
(Peut)γ(EtPust)1−γ (2)
P US
t =
1
γw
(Peut/Et)γ(Pust)1−γ
where Et i st h ee x c h a n g er a t ed e ﬁned as the price of converting dollars into euros.9
Notice that, because preferences are symmetric, the law-of-one-price implies that PPP
holds between price deﬂators.
Firms in both economies operate under perfect competition. However, since labor
inputs are diﬀerentiated and ﬁrms use a continuum of inputs in production, the labor
9The parameter γw i saf u n c t i o no ft h es h a r e so fE u r o p e a na n dU Sg o o d si nt h ew o r l dm a r k e t ,
such that γw ≡ (γ)γ(1 − γ)1−γ.
4market operates under monopolistic competition. In Europe, for example, producers
set their production (Yeu), given the price of the home product (Peu), wages (Weu),
and the labor supply (Leu),s oa st om a x i m i z ep r o ﬁts, subject to a production function
with imperfect substitutability across labor inputs:
Max
L,Y
h
PeutYeut −
R 1
0 Weut(j)Leut(j)dj
i
s.t. Yeut =
·
R 1
0 Leut(j)
φ−1
φ dj
¸ φ
φ−1
φ>1
(3)
Notice that the larger is φ (the elasticity of substitution across inputs) the lower is
the market power of workers. From the ﬁrst order conditions it is possible to obtain
an expression for the equilibrium total wage income of individual j, in Europe, and
an analogous expression for the US:
Weut(j)Leut(j)=Leut(j)
1−1
φPeutYeut
1
φ
Following Corsetti and Pesenti (1999), nominal rigidities are introduced in the short
run in the form of predetermined nominal wages. Following a shock, wages can
only adjust to their long-run steady state level after one period. In a symmetric
equilibrium, in which all workers supply the same amount of labour, that is Leut(j)=
Leut,f o ra l lj, it follows that Yeut = Leut and Weut = Peut, from the production
function and the ﬁrst order condition, respectively. Hence the nominal wage rigidity
is fully translated into a short-run price rigidity.
A tt h es a m et i m e ,c o n s u m e r si nE u r o p ea n di nt h eU Sh a v et om a k ed e c i s i o n s
regarding their consumption level, their savings, and the labour supply. At the be-
ginning of period τ, consumers can trade assets using their savings from the previous
period and, after that ﬁnancial exchange, they can buy goods using cash balances de-
nominated in the currency of the producer. The savings can then be used in the next
ﬁnancial exchange. Given these assumptions, the representative European consumer,
for example, maximizes the intertemporal utility U:
U =
∞ X
τ=0
β
τ
·
CEU(j)1−ρ
τ
1 − ρ
+ V (Geuτ) −
k
2
Leu(j)
2
τ
¸
ρ>0,ρ6=1
subject to the cash-in-advance constraints (4) and to the ﬁnancial constraint (5),
where MEU
eu (j)τ, MEU
us (j)τ stand for the nominal quantities of cash denominated in
euros and dollars that are demanded by individual j in Europe.10 In addition, AEU
eu (j)τ
10The variables for US consumers can be obtained by replacing the superscript EU with US.
5and AEU
us (j)τ are European and US real assets respectively; Eτ stands for the nom-
inal exchange rate, and Ωτ−1 is the wealth carried over from the previous period.
Therefore:
C
EU
eu (j)τ ≤
MEU
eu (j)τ
Peuτ
C
EU
us (j)τ ≤
MEU
us (j)τ
Pusτ
(4)
M
EU
eu (j)τ + EτM
EU
us (j)τ + P
EU
τ A
EU
eu (j)τ + P
EU
τ A
EU
us (j)τ ≤ Ω
EU(j)τ−1 (5)
The wealth Ωτ−1consists of last period’s wage income, lump-sum transfers, cash bal-
ances, real assets and interest earnings, accumulated over the previous period.11 Due
to arbitrage in the asset market, the real interest rates in the two economies have to
equalize, so that reut = rust = rt,f o ra l lt. An analogous problem is also solved by
consumers in the US.
In each country, the governments can only ﬁnance their spending through taxes, or
by issuing debt, while the central bank issues ﬁat money and distributes seigniorage
revenues to the public in the form of lump-sum transfers.12 Each period t, the nominal
value of these lump-sum transfers in both countries must be equal to the increase in
the nominal money stock, such that PEU
t TCBeut =( Meut+1 − Meut) for the euro area,
and P US
t TCBust =( Must+1 − Must) for the US, where TCB eut and TCB ust denote
the ECB’s and FED’s real seigniorage transfers, respectively. Assuming that the
governments collect lump-sum taxes TG eut and TGust,t h eﬁscal budget constraints
c a nb ew r i t t e na s : 13
Beut+1 − Beut = reutBeut +
PeutGeut
PEU
t
− TG eut (6)
Bust+1 − Bust = rustBust +
PustGust
P US
t
− TG ust
Consequently, the total net transfers received/paid by the consumers in Europe and
in the US, which were previously denoted by Teut and Tust, consist of the diﬀerence
between the corresponding seigniorage transfers and the corresponding lump-sum
taxes, such that Teut = TCB eut − TGeut and Tust = TCB ust − TG ust. The private
budget constraints, together with the government budget constraints also imply that
at each point in time the current accounts of each economy must satisfy the following
11The expression for Ωt−1 is in the appendix.
12The assumptions about the government budget constraints diﬀer from those made by Corsetti
and Pesenti (1998), who assume no government bonds and a consolidated budget constraint for
monetary and ﬁscal policy. Instead, the assumptions here follow closely Ghironi’s assumptions
(Ghironi, 1998).
13For convenience, the European ﬁscal stances will be treated as an aggregate.
6relationships:
NFAEU
t =( 1+reut−1)NFAEU
t−1 +
Peut(Yeut − Geut)
P EU
t
− CEU
t (7)
NFAUS
t =( 1+rust−1)NFAUS
t−1 +
Pust(Yust − Gust)
PUS
t
− CUS
t
where NFAEU
t = AEU
eut + AEU
ust − Beut and NFAUS
t = AUS
eut + AUS
ust − Bust are the net
foreign assets in Europe and in the US, respectively. In addition, equilibrium in asset
markets requires that: AEU
eut +AUS
eut = Beut and AEU
ust +AUS
ust = Bust. All these conditions
imply that global net foreign assets expressed in a common currency must be zero,
that is PEU
t NFAEU
t + EtPUS
t NFAUS
t =0 , and given that PPP holds, this condition
can be expressed as NFAUS
t = −NFAEU
t .
Finally, both goods market are in equilibrium as long as demand equals supply.
Therefore, equations (8) give the goods markets equilibrium conditions;
Peut(Yeut − Geut)=Peut
¡
CEU
eut + CUS
eut
¢
(8)
Pust(Yust − Gust)=Pust
¡
CEU
ust + CUS
ust
¢
Similarly, the money market equilibrium, in which the supply of both home and
foreign money meet their corresponding demands, is given by equations (9):
Meut = M
EU
eut + M
US
ust Must = M
EU
ust + M
US
ust (9)
Using these results and the restrictions imposed by the cash-in-advance constraints it
is possible to obtain a quantity theory of money equation with velocity equal to one:
Meut = PeutCEU
eut + PeutCUS
eut ⇒ Meut = Peut(Yeut − Geut) (10)
Must = PustCEU
ust + PustCUS
ust ⇒ Must = Pust(Yust − Gust)
The steady state equilibrium is deﬁned as a sequence of prices and allocations in
both countries for which: (i) consumption and output are constant; (ii) governments’
spending and the money supplies do not change; (iii) cash-in advance constraints are
binding; (iv) the consumers’ budget constraint and the government budget constraint
are satisﬁed with equality; (v)a l lﬁrst order conditions, including the Euler equation,
hold with equality; (vi) markets clear and Bt = B,∀t;a n d( vii) the transversality
conditions are satisﬁed. From (i) and because the Euler equation must hold, it follows
that in the steady state, r =
1−β
β ≡ δ. Since the money supply and government
spending remain unchanged in the steady state and (i)h o l d s ,t h e ni tf o l l o w sf r o m
equations (10) that prices will also remain constant and inﬂation will therefore be
7zero. In turn, zero inﬂation and a constant long-run real interest rate equal to δ,
imply a constant long-run nominal interest rate also equal to δ.14
Given the preceding deﬁnition assume that at time t =0the economy is at its
steady state, while at t =1there may be shocks to the money supply and/or to
government spending. Since there is perfect foresight while wages take one period
to adjust, the problem then is reduced to a two period model, with a new steady
state in the second period. For simplicity, let variables with a bar denote steady state
equilibrium values. The initial steady state can be distinguished from the ﬁnal steady
state by a time zero subscript.
The solution of the model is presented in Appendix A.2. It can be obtained by
noticing that the current account equations provide a link between the short-run and
the long-run. Assuming that the initial level of debt is equal to zero, the equilibrium
in the external sector implies that there is no international lending or borrowing, and
that the ratio between the European and the US consumption is equal to the relative
market shares of European and US products in the world market, both in the long
and in the short-run. The result that policy shocks have no impact on the current
accounts stems from the assumption of a unitary intratemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion between the composite goods produced in each country. In this model, just as in
Corsetti and Pesenti (1999) and in Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1998), when the income of
the consumers of one country increases relatively to the income of consumers abroad,
their purchasing power declines proportionally, due to the Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation
of preferences, leaving no incentives for international lending or borrowing.15 This
result together with the ﬁrst order conditions allow for three equilibrium loci in this
model, YC 1, YC 2 and MC, which can be found in Appendix A.2. The locus YC 1 is
obtained from the goods market equilibrium and implies a relationship between con-
sumption and output; the locus YC 2, derived from the labour-leisure trade-oﬀ ﬁrst
order condition, also provides a relationship between consumption and output; and
the locus MC, derived from the cash-in-advance constraints and the quantity theory
equation, produces a relationship between consumption and real money balances.
In the long run, both the labor-leisure trade oﬀ and the goods market equilibrium
will be binding in the two economies. These two relations determine the two equi-
librium loci between consumption and output, YC 1 and YC 2, which are enough to
14The ﬁrst order conditions are shown in Appendix A.1
15The fact that price responses can make international trade in securities redundant with Cobb-
Douglas preferences was pointed out by Cole and Obstfeld (1991).For more details about the intuition
for this result see Corsetti and Pesenti (1999). Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995) and Ghironi (1998)
obtain a role for the current account in their model speciﬁcations, but at the expense of analytical
tractability. In their models, the elasticity of intratemporal substitution is diﬀerent from one and
is the same as the index of monopolistic distortion, because their monopolistic competition arises
from assumptions on preferences.
8determine the long-run levels for these variables in Europe and in the US. In the long
run, money will have no eﬀect on consumption and output and it will only determine
prices. Money will not have an eﬀect on the terms of trade either:
C
EU
= acβ
1
1+ρ(gw)
− 1
1+ρ (11)
Y eu = ayβ
1
1+ρ(g)
1
2(gw)
− 1−ρ
2(1+ρ) (12)
P
EU
=( ac)−1β
− 1
1+ρg
1
1+ρ
w Meu (13)
Peu =( ac)ρ−1ayΦ−1β
− 1
1+ρ(geu)
1
2(gw)
1−ρ
2(1+ρ)Meu (14)
E =
1 − γ
γ
MR (15)
EPus
Peu
= ap(gR)−1
2 (16)
where ac, ay and ap are parameters deﬁned in Appendix A.2.16 Analogous solutions
will hold for the US.
In the short run, on the other hand, in the presence of nominal rigidities and
monopolistic competition in the labor market, agents do not necessarily operate on
their labor supply schedule, so that the locus YC 2,d e ﬁned by the leisure labour
trade-oﬀs, does not determine the short-run solution.17 During the period when
prices remain ﬁxed, consumption and output levels are simply determined by the
cash-in-advance constraints and the goods market equilibrium, and therefore by the
16As it is shown in the appendix, geu ≡ Yeu/(Yeu − Geu) and gus ≡ Yus/(Yus −Gus). In addition
the following world aggregates (xwt) and relative indexes (xRt) where also deﬁned, such that xwt ≡
(xeut)γ(xust)1−γ and xRt ≡ xeut/xust,w h e r ex is the relevant variable. Similar aggregated are also
used for parameters (see the appendix).
The long-run equilibrium of this model is almost analogous to the one of the model set up by
Corsetti and Pesenti (1998). The only diﬀerence is the factor β
1
1+ρ, which appear in this version due
to the fact that the cash-in-advance requirements make labor income only available with a period
of lag.
17It will be assumed that the range of shocks is such that the real wage does not fall below the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure, otherwise workers would not be
willing to modify their work eﬀort at a ﬁxed nominal wage. See Corsetti and Pesenti (1999) for
more details.
9equilibrium loci YC 1 and MC.18
Yeu = Y eu0
Meu
Meu0
geu
geu0
(17)
CEU = C
EU
0
Mw
Mw0
(18)
PEU =( ac)−1β
− 1
1+ρ(gw0)
1
1+ρMw0(MR)1−γ (19)
Peu =( ac)ρ−1ayΦ−1β
− 1
1+ρ(geu0)
1
2(gw0)
1−ρ
2(1+ρ)Meu0 (20)
E =
1 − γ
γ
MR (21)
EPus
Peu
= ap(gR0)−1
2 MR
MR0 (22)
Consumption in the short-run changes relative to its initial level proportionally to
changes in the world money supply, because consumers must hold both currencies
in order to be able to consume European and US goods. Since in this model goods
must always be acquired with the currency of the producer, European output does
not depend on the stock of dollars, but simply on the stock of euros.19
3 Alternative Monetary Policy Rules
How will a monetary policy shock, originating in the US, be transmitted to the Euro-
pean economy? Which kind of monetary policy rule may best insulate the European
economy from foreign monetary policy disturbances? Assume there are three alter-
native rules: to target the interest rate, to target a constant rate of money growth,
or set an inﬂation target. Fulﬁlling the model equilibrium conditions determines that
not all targets can be set independently. Note in particular that the following rela-
tionships between the interest rate and money growth, and between money growth
and inﬂation must hold:20
1+ieu =
1
β
µ
gw
gw0
¶ 1−ρ
1+ρ µ
Mw
Mw0
¶1−ρ Meu
Meu
(23)
18C
EU
0 = acβ
1
1+ρ(gw0)
− 1
1+ρ and Y eu0 = a5β
1
1+ρg0
1
2(gw0)
−
1−ρ
2(1+ρ) are the initial steady-state equi-
librium levels of the European consumption and output, respectively.
19Solutions in all respects analogous to these can be found for the case of the US, but will be
omitted here for simplicity of exposition.
20Notice that an economy’s interest rate is inversely related to the demand for cash balances
denominated in its currency for any ρ>0 and any γ ∈ [0,1].
10P EU
P
EU
0
=
µ
MR
MR0
¶1−γ
(24)
P
EU
P EU =
µ
gw
gw0
¶ 1
1+ρ Mw
Mw0
Meu
Meu
(25)
Assume now that there is only a permanent shock to the US money supply, such that
Mus 6= Mus0,b u tµ∗ = Mus/Mus =1 ; and that government expenditures remain
ﬁxed at geu0 and g∗
eu0, both in the short and in the long run. Since monetary policy
has no eﬀect in the long run, output and consumption in the new steady-state are
the same under both monetary policy rules and are equal to their initial levels.
3.1 Money Targeting
In this regime, the monetary authority commits to constant gross rate of money
growth µ in the short run, and µ in the long run, given the initial money stock
Meu0. For simplicity it will be assumed that µ = µ =1 , hence under this regime
Meu = Meu = Meu0. The nominal interest rate is endogenously determined according
to equation (23), such that:
1+ieu =
1
β
µ
Mus
Mus0
¶(1−γ)(1−ρ)
(26)
Since the stock of euros is constant, output will also remain equal to its initial steady-
state level, provided that ﬁscal policy remains unchanged (equation 18). Nonetheless
a change in the US money supply will induce a change in the world money supply,
w h i c hw i l li nt u r na ﬀect consumption, since:
Mw
Mw0
=
µ
Mus
Mus0
¶1−γ
(27)
In the short run, the exchange, which is determined by the relative short-run money
supply MR, will change proportionally to the money growth in the US, and, given the
producer price rigidities, the consumer price index will simply follow the movement
in the exchange-rate:
E
E0
=
µ
Mus
Mus0
¶−1 PEU
P
EU
0
=
µ
Mus
Mus0
¶−(1−γ)
(28)
In the long run, however, because the shock to the US money supply is assumed to be
permanent, there will be no further adjustments in the exchange rate. In this case,
there is an immediate adjustment of the exchange rate to its long-run level, that is
11E = E. The long-run eﬀect of the US money shock on inﬂation can be found by
substituting (27) on (25), and letting Meu = Meu and gw = gw0.I n t h i s c a s e , t h e
long-run price index movement oﬀsets the short-run eﬀect. The price level moves by
the same amount in both periods but in opposite directions. When all adjustments
take place, price deﬂators go back to their initial steady-state levels, in this case.
P
EU
PEU =
µ
Mus
Mus0
¶1−γ
(29)
3.2 Interest Rate Targeting
Under this policy regime, it is assumed that the monetary authority commits to ﬁxing
the nominal interest rate at its steady state equilibrium level, such that ieu = δ.U n d e r
this policy it is necessary to assume that expectations about the long-run money
supply are known, otherwise there is an indeterminacy problem when the government
simply targets the interest rate. Therefore, it will be assumed that µ = Meu/Meu =1 ,
with Meu0 given. Substituting this policy rule into equation (23), allows us to derive
the rate of growth of money in the euro area as a function of the US money supply:
Meu
Meu0
=
µ
Mus
Mus0
¶−
1−γ
γ
(30)
In the short run, output will change proportionally to the change in the US money
supply given that the domestic money stock will also change (equation 18). Consump-
tion, on the other hand, will be insulated from US monetary shocks, since keeping
the nominal interest rate ﬁxed also stabilizes the world money supply. This occurs
because UIP holds in this model, and because shocks are assumed to be permanent,
such that µ = µ∗ =1 , making the nominal interest rate respond only to changes in
the world money supply.21
Mw
Mw0
=1 (31)
21In order to see this, notice that: 1+ieu =( 1+ius)
E
E
⇒
1+ieu
1+ius
=
MR
MR
⇒
1+ieu
1+ius
=
µ
µ∗,where
1+ius can be replaced by the foreign counterpart of equation (23):
1+ieu
β
−1µ∗(Mw/Mwo)1−ρ =
µ
µ∗.
Hence: 1+ieu = β
−1µ(Mw/Mwo)1−ρ,w h e nµ = µ∗ =1 .W h e nµ 6=1 ,t h es a m ee ﬀect of keeping
the world money demand constant would be produced by ﬁxing 1+ieu = δ + β
−1(µ − 1). When
µ>1, there is a pressure for the interest rate to go up through expected inﬂation, therefore, the
interest rate must be higher than δ in order to oﬀset this eﬀect. When µ<1 t h eo p p o s i t eo c c u r s .
12Under this policy regime, the impact of a foreign money supply shock on the exchange
rate, will depend on the world market share of European goods. The smaller this
share, that is the larger γ, the higher the share of US goods in the world market and
the higher the elasticity of the exchange rate to US money supply shocks. The price
level will be determined by the changes in the nominal exchange rate:
E
E0
=
µ
Mus
Mus0
¶− 1
γ
PEU
P
EU
0
=
³
Mus
Mus0
´−
1−γ
γ
However, in the long-run there will be no further adjustments in the exchange rate
(E = E) and no further adjustments in the price indexes (since it was assumed that
µ = Meu/Meu =1in order to avoid the price level indeterminacy mentioned earlier).
In this case, P
EU
= PEU will be above (below) the initial steady state level given the
contractionary (expansionary) US monetary shock.
3.3 Inﬂation Targeting
Under an inﬂation targeting regime the central bank will aim at maintaining a con-
stant rate of inﬂation π0. Without changes in ﬁscal policy, this requires that:
P EU
P
EU
0
=
µ
MR
MR0
¶1−γ
=1+π0
P
EU
P EU =
Mw
Mw0
Meu
Meu
=1+π0
Assuming for simplicity that π0 =0 , this implies that the European monetary au-
thority must set the money supply according to the following reaction function:
Meu
Meu0
=
Mus
Mus0
Meu
Meu
=
µ
Mus
Mus0
¶−1
Notice that maintaining the price index constant is, in the short run, equivalent
to ﬁxing the nominal exchange rate, since output prices are ﬁxed for one period.
Therefore, under this policy regime, the short-run nominal exchange rate must remain
at its initial level. In the long-run, although the real variables will not be aﬀected
by monetary policy, the nominal exchange rate may have to adjust depending on
13whether the US money shock is temporary (that is, is reversed after one period), or
permanent.22
Notice that inﬂation targeting ranks (unsurprisingly) ﬁrst in its ability to stabilize
inﬂation. Since there is no uncertainty in the transmission mechanism the monetary
authority can perfectly achieve price stability with this rule, while under the other
two rules prices have to adjust to the US money supply shock in the long run. The
ranking on the other two policies depends on the export share of European producers
in the world market. The lower the share of European goods in the world market,
ceteris paribus, the less attractive interest rate targeting becomes in comparison to
money growth targeting for stabilizing inﬂation.23
3.4 Eﬀects on Consumption and Output
Table 1 summarizes the impact on European consumption and European output of a
shock in the US money supply, under the alternative policy scenarios. Since the utility
of consumers depends on consumption and leisure (which is a function of output),
these eﬀects will be important in determining the trade-oﬀs between one rule and
another. As seen before, when the stock of euro money balances is kept constant,
output suﬀers no changes but European consumption is aﬀected by the shock. On
the other hand, if the nominal interest rate is kept ﬁxed, Eurozone consumption
remains stable but output adjusts. Under inﬂation targeting, both consumption and
output will respond to the US monetary shock, given the change in the European
money supply needed to maintain the inﬂation target. Under this policy regime, the
proportional increase in consumption is exactly equal to the proportional increase
in output. Given these results, it is clear that the relative impact of each of these
policies on the utility of consumers will depend on the relative weight of consumption
and output in the utility function.
22In the long run, the nominal exchange rate must respond to short-run and long-run changes in
the US money supply as follows:
E
EU
EEU =
µ
Mus
Mus0
Mus
Mus
¶−1
If the US monetary shock is reversed such that Mus = Mus0, the nominal exchange rate E
EU
will remain at the initial steady state level. However, if the increase in the US money supply is
permanent, then Mus = Mus and the long-run nominal exchange rate will have to adjust by
Mus
Mus0
.
23This result is shown in Appendix (A.3).
14Table 1: Eﬀects of a US money supply shock in Europe under alternative policy rules.
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4 Policies for the ECB
The ranking of alternative policies available to the ECB will be based on each policy’s
ability to minimize the impact of exogenous shocks relative to the steady-state utility
level. Formally the problem is to minimize the quadratic loss function:24
Leu = E[(U − U0)
2]
Since utility depends on both consumption and output, policies should take into
account of changes in both these variables. Although targeting the money supply
mitigates the eﬀects of a foreign monetary shock on output, such a policy cannot
stabilize consumption - which depends on the world money supply - fully. Conversely,
a ﬁxed nominal interest rate policy is successful at insulating consumption from the
monetary policy shock, but not as a buﬀer to output changes. Hence the use of one
of these policy rules in isolation cannot fully insulate welfare from an external foreign
policy shock.
24This chapter shows that the policy which maximizes utility given a positive shock will be the one
which minimizes it given a negative shock and vice-versa. Therefore the best rule to maximize utility
at all times would be a switching rule, a type of “combination” rule which will not be considered
here. If the expected value of shocks is zero, the best that monetary policy can do in terms of welfare
under a non-switching rule type of regime is to insulate utility from shocks. this loss function is also
in line with the Lucas welfare measure, used by Collard, Dellas and Ertz (2000) as one measure to
evaluate their alternative policies. Such a measure consists of calculating how much consumption
consumers would be willing to sacriﬁce to perfectly avoid any utility ﬂuctuations.
15In Poole’s model (Poole, 1970), one policy was more successful than the other
in stabilizing the economy depending on whether the shocks hitting the economy
came from the expenditure sector, or from the monetary sector. To control for both
types of shocks simultaneously, it was suggested that the monetary authority should
pursue a combination policy, of a money and an interest rate target, in such a way
that the weights take into account of the relative variance of the shocks. A similar
trade-oﬀ between stabilizing the diﬀerent components of utility (consumption and
leisure) exits here, which can be addressed by a combination policy in a similar way
to Poole’s suggestion. In order to analyze this formally, it is convenient to rewrite
the loss function, such that:
Leu = β
2E
"µ
¡
C
EU
0
¢1−ρ ln
µ
Mw
Mw0
¶
− K (Yeu0)
2 ln
µ
Meu
Meu0
¶¶2#
(32)
using x ' ln(x +1 ) .25 Under a ﬁxed monetary growth policy the loss function takes
the following form:
LM|eu = β
2 (1 − γ)
2 ¡
C
EU
0
¢2(1−ρ) σ
2
Mus (33)
where σ2
Mus is the expected variance of the US monetary shock .Alternatively, if the
ECB pursues a ﬁxed nominal interest rate rule, the loss function will be given by:
Li|eu = β
2 (1 − γ)
2
µ
1
γ
K (Yeu0)
2
¶2
σ
2
Mus
The two expressions can then be conveniently compared, by dividing one by the other.
In addition deﬁne ξeu ≡
³
(C
EU
0 )(1−ρ)
´
/
¡
k(Y eu0)2¢
,w h i c hc a nb eu n d e r s t o o da st h e
relative weight of consumption versus output in the steady state utility function, to
obtain:
LM
Li
|eu =( γξeu)
2 (34)
where
ξeu =
(C
EU
0 )(1−ρ)
k(Y eu0)2 =
φ
(φ − 1)
1
β(geu0)
Notice that ξeu is always positive.26 Since ξeu and γ are positive, the ratio (34) is
higher (lower) than one depending on whether ξeu is higher (lower) than the inverse of
γ.R e c a l lt h a tγ represents the eﬀective macroeconomic size of the European economy,
25The algebra needed to derive the results in this section is shown in Appendix A.4.
26The relative weight of consumption and output in the utility function, ξeu,w i l lb eh i g h e r ,t h e
higher the market power of workers (the lower φ), the lower the discount factor, and the lower the
steady-state government spending Geu0 (the lower geu0).
16in terms of the weight of the European goods in the world consumption, therefore,
the inverse of γ is proportional to the size of the US.
ξeu <
1
γ
⇒ LM|eu <L i|eu
ξeu >
1
γ
⇒ Li|eu <L M|eu
A ﬁxed interest rate policy seems, therefore, to be more attractive for the European
economy if the representative consumer attaches a higher weight on the utility derived
from consumption rather than on the disutility from work. Conversely if the repre-
sentative consumer attaches a larger weight on the disutility from work, it should be
more prone to support a ﬁxed money growth target. To illustrate graphically the
choice between the nominal interest rate and the money growth rate for monetary
policy targets two examples have been estimated, setting g0 =1 /0.9, β =0 .9, ρ =4 ,
γ =0 .5 in both cases and diﬀerent values of the parameter of monopolistic compe-
tition for each case. Figure 1 shows the case in which φ is high enough, given the
17assumptions on the remaining parameters (low market power of workers), so that
ξ<(1/γ). Figure 2 shows the case in which φ is low enough, given the values chosen
for the other parameters (high market power of workers), such that ξ>(1/γ).H e r e
the actual utility function is plotted, rather than the loglinear approximation.
Figure 1: Utility Comparisons: ξ<
1
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18Figure 2: Utility Comparisons: ξ>
1
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In both ﬁgures, the initial equilibrium point is denoted ‘Eqo’. The alternative
ﬁnal equilibrium points, depending on whether the US follows an expansionary or a
contractionary monetary policy, given that Europe follows a constant money supply
rule, are labeled ‘Eq1m’a n d‘ Eq2m’, respectively. In Figure 1, these are closer,
in utility terms, to ‘Eqo’t h a n‘ Eq1i’a n d‘ Eq2i’, which are the corresponding ﬁnal
equilibrium points when Europe follows a constant interest rate rule. In the case
represented in Figure 1, where ξ<(1/γ),t h eﬁxed money supply rule stabilizes
utility more. In Figure 2, when ξ>(1/γ), the opposite occurs: utility varies less
when Europe follows a constant nominal interest rate rule.
From the previous analysis it can be seen that it is impossible to insulate com-
19pletely the economy from foreign shocks using either instrument alone. This is because
with one instrument you can only pursue one objective, while stabilizing the utility
function entails two. However, a combination policy, of the family proposed by Poole,
in which the money stock and the nominal interest rate are maintained in a certain
relationship to each other can solve the problem. In this case, the optimal relationship
will have to take into account of the relative weight of consumption and output in the
utility function and the relative size of the countries. Formally, such a combination
policy can be deﬁned as a relationship of the type:
µ
Meu
Meu0
¶α
=
µ
1+i
1+δ
¶1−α
which minimizes the loss function, and where α determines the relationship main-
tained between the money growth and the nominal interest rate target. The com-
bination policy becomes a pure money growth rate policy, when α =1 ,o rap u r e
interest rate policy when α =0 . The value of the parameter α for which the loss
function is zero for any value of σ2
Mus, determines the monetary policy rule which
insulates the economy from the US monetary shock. In this case that value is given
by:27
α =
(ρ − 1)
(ρ − 1) − ξeu
; ξeu 6=
1
γ
where ξeu,i sd e ﬁn e da sb e f o r ei n( 3 4 ) .
The inability to stabilize welfare with only one instrument can also emerge under
inﬂation targeting. In this model, under inﬂation targeting, the foreign monetary
disturbance aﬀects equally consumption and output. Hence this policy will only
stabilize utility fully if the weights of consumption and output/leisure in the utility
function are the same. Otherwise, a combination policy including inﬂation and either
the money stock growth or the nominal interest rate can do better. Below these two
types of policies will be denoted two-pillar policy with the nominal interest rate and
two-pillar policy with the money growth rate.
Formally, the two-pillar policy with the nominal interest rate, combining an inﬂa-
tion and a nominal interest rate target, can be described by the following relationship:
µ
PEU
PEU
0
¶απi
=
µ
1+ieu
1+δ
¶1−απi
which must minimize the loss function, and where απi determines the nature of the
relationship between the variables in the combination. When απi =1the combination
policy is a pure inﬂation targeting policy. Conversely, when απi =0 ,i tb e c o m e sa
27The calculations are shown in Appendix A.5.
20pure ﬁxed interest rate rule. Under this rule, the value of απi which allows to insulate
the economy from the US monetary disturbance is given by:28
απi =
ρ − 1
ρ − ξeu
; ξeu 6=
1
γ
If, on the other hand, the ECB decides to rely targeting the money stock, instead
of the nominal interest rate, it will follow the two-pillar policy with the money growth
rate. This strategy can be deﬁned as a relationship between inﬂation and the money
growth rate of the form:
Ã
PEU
P
EU
0
!απM
=
µ
Meu
Meu0
¶1−απM
which minimizes the loss function, and where απM determines the nature of the
relationship between the two variables. This policy becomes a pure inﬂation target
when απM =1 , and a pure constant money supply policy when απM =0 .I n t h i s
case, the value of απM which sets the loss function equal to zero can be written as:29
απM =
ξeu
2ξeu − 1
; ξeu 6=
1
γ
In all cases the optimal combination policy is superior compared with the single or
"pure" policy rules.30 It seems diﬃcult to give preference for one kind of policy index
over the other, since they all facilitate insulation of the economy from the US money
stock disturbance. However, the simpler the rule, the easier it will be to implement
it properly. As in Poole (1970), the success of the combination policy depends on
knowledge of the parameters and even the sign of the optimal relationship cannot be
determined without such a knowledge: a combination policy based on intuition can
be worse than either of the pure policy rules. Within this framework, the fact that
the two-pillar policy with the money growth rate (which combines the money stock
and inﬂation) does not require knowledge of the parameter of risk aversion, seems
to be an advantage. Nevertheless, all combination policies require the knowledge of
the parameter of monopolistic competition. The parameter φ determines the kind of
relationship to be maintained between the policy variables, for a given market size,
γ,ag i v e nc o e ﬃcient of time preference and a given steady state ﬁscal intervention
parameter, geu0.31
28The calculations are shown in Appendix A.5.
29See Appendix A.5.
30Except in the particular case where the relative weights of consumption and leisure in the utility
function are the same. In that case inﬂation targeting can also achieve full welfare stabilization, but
only for very restrictive set of parameters.
31Notice that it is only the level of the parameter of monopolistic competition in Europe that
matters for the ECB policy decisions and not its size relatively to the size of the corresponding US
parameter. This version of the model cannot exploit the impact of the diﬀerences between US and
European labor markets.
21It is important to notice though that all the “combinations” discussed so far allow
the US money supply shock to pass-through to inﬂation, by the same amount. The
changes in prices in the short run and in the long run are given by equations (35) and
(36) whatever the “combination” policy pursued, when the policy parameter αj is set
according to the optimal welfare criteria discussed before, for ξeu 6=1 /γ:
PEU
P
EU
0
=
µ
Mus
Mus0
¶(1−γ)(ξeu−1)
1−γξeu (35)
P
EU
PEU =
µ
Mus
Mus0
¶ 1−γ
1−γξeu (36)
The total change in the price level, resulting from the shock is therefore:
P
EU
P
EU
0
=
µ
Mus
Mus0
¶(1−γ)ξeu
1−γξeu
The only policy that allows to insulate inﬂation from the foreign money supply shock,
in this model, is simple inﬂation targeting.
5 Other Policy Alternatives and Shocks
5.1 Other Policy Alternatives
The exchange rate is an alternative tool for the conduct of monetary policy in an open
economy. Although the ECB has already stated that it will not follow any speciﬁc
policy with regard to the exchange rate, it will inevitably monitor developments in
this variable and take these into account when formulating policy. In order to keep
the exchange rate ﬁxed, the European monetary authority must set the money supply
according to the following reaction function:
E = E0 ⇒ Meu =
Meu0
Mus0
Mus
E = E ⇒ Meu =
Meu
Mus
Mus
Assuming that the US monetary authority changes its money stock permanently,
that is, assuming that µ∗ is equal to one, then setting µ equal to one is enough
to ensure that the policy rule is observed in the long run.32 In the short run, the
32Recall that µ∗ =
Mus
Mus
and µ =
Meu
Meu
.
22eﬀect of this policy on consumption and output is exactly the same as under inﬂation
targeting. Since output prices are ﬁxed in the short run, movements in the consumer
price index are due to ﬂuctuations in the exchange rate. However, if the US money
shock is permanent, under this policy regime, prices will have to ﬁnally adjust in the
long-run, such that:
P
EU
P EU =
Mus
Mus0
As in the inﬂation targeting framework, under a ﬁxed exchange rate regime, the
foreign monetary disturbances produce a proportional eﬀect on consumption and
output, but this policy can only fully stabilize utility if the weights of consumption
and output/leisure in the utility function are the same. Alternatively, a combination
policy which includes the nominal exchange rate, and either the money stock growth
or the nominal interest rate, can do better.33 Both types of combinations have already
been introduced in the literature. A combination between the interest rate and the
exchange rate, usually referred to as the Monetary Conditions Index (MCI) and
already used in practice by the Bank of Canada, for instance, has been recently
analyzed by Freeman (1994). Combinatorial rules specifying trade-oﬀso fm o n e t a r y
growth against exchange rate deviations from a pre-speciﬁed path, which will be
denoted International Money Index, have been defended by Artis and Currie (1981)
because of their ability to control for losses in competitiveness. They show evidence
which suggests that the pursuit of monetary targets has frequently been associated
with substantial and persistent real appreciation (German and Switzerland between
1978 and 1979 and the UK in 1977 and 1979-80), which can be avoided by including
t h ee x c h a n g er a t ei nt h et a r g e t i n gr u l e .
Targeting a Monetary Conditions Index can be deﬁned as targeting the relation-
ship of the type: µ
Eeu
Eeu0
¶αMCI
=
µ
1+ieu
1+δ
¶1−αMCI
which minimizes the loss function, and where αMCI determines the weight of each
variable in the combination. If αMCI =1the combination policy is a pure ﬁxed
33The ﬁrst application of the instrument problem developed by Poole (1970) to the choice of an
exchange rate regime can be found in Boyer (1978). Boyer uses a simple IS-LM open economy model
to compare, in terms of output variability, a ﬂexible regime with intervention regimes, operating
either through open market operations or through ﬁscal and commercial policy instruments. As
in Poole the optimal policies depend on the sources of shocks and the optimal intervention is a
compromise between full ﬂexibility and complete ﬁxity. Parkin (1978) reviews the results assuming
rational expectations and investigates whether the stabilization problem still holds. He ﬁnds that
even if expectations are rational, the choice of the instrument will still determine which variable in
the economy will cushion the shock, which is exactly the point that this paper, more explicitly, tries
to make.
23exchange rate policy, while if αMCI =0this reduces to a pure interest rate rule.
In this case the value of αMCI which insulates the economy from the foreign money
supply shock is equal to:34
αMCI =
(1 − γ)(ρ − 1)
(1 + (1 − γ)(ρ − 1)) − ξeu
; ξeu 6=
1
γ
The International Money Index (IMI) targeting, on the other hand, can be deﬁned
as a relationship between the exchange rate and the money growth rate of the form:
µ
E
E0
¶αIMI
=
µ
Meu
Meu0
¶1−αIMI
which minimizes the loss function, and where αIMI determines the nature of the
relationship between the two variables. The IMI policy collapses into a pure ﬁxed
exchange rate policy when αIMI =1and into a pure money supply rule when αIMI =
0.T h ev a l u eo fαIMI for which the loss function is minimized is now equal to:35
αIMI =
(1 − γ)ξeu
(2 − γ)ξeu − 1
; ξeu 6=
1
γ
As in the case of the two-pillar policy with the money growth rate no knowledge of
the parameter of risk aversion ρ is required to implement this policy rule. However a
precise knowledge of γ (the world market share) is required, in this case.
Other possible rules could also be analyzed. Nominal income targeting, for in-
stance can be obtained as special case of targeting an index containing the nominal
exchange rate and the money stock. This can be seen by writing the expression for
the short-run nominal income growth as follows:
PEU
P
EU
0
Yeu
Y eu0
=
µ
E
E0
¶1−γ Meu
Meu0
The intuition behind this is that, in the short run, the price index responds to changes
in the nominal exchange rate while real output responds to changes in the money
stock. Nominal income targeting however, implies maintaining a particular relation-
ship between the exchange rate and the money stock which is exactly given by the
relative share of US goods in the world market, as shown in equation (37).
PEU
P
EU
0
Yeu
Y eu0
=1⇒
µ
E
E0
¶1− 1
γ
=
µ
Meu
Meu0
¶ 1
γ
(37)
34The calculations are shown in Appendix A.5.
35See Appendix A.5 for details.
24This relationship will only correspond to the optimal IMI d e s c r i b e di ns e c t i o n5 ,i f
the relative weight between consumption and output in the utility function is equal
to 1/2, that is, the output term in the steady state utility function has to have twice
as much weight as the consumption term for a nominal income strategy to be able to
fully stabilize utility. Recall that the optimal relationship between the exchange rate
and the money shock, determining the IMI implies:
αIMI =
(1 − γ)ξeu
(2 − γ)ξeu − 1
Hence, targeting nominal income will only be equivalent to using the optimal IMI
targeting provided αIMI =1 − 1
γ, that is, as long as the following condition is satisﬁed:
(1 − γ)ξeu
(2 − γ)ξeu − 1
=1−
1
γ
⇒ ξeu =
1
2
Although the discussion presented here has only focused on one type of distur-
bance, namely US money shocks, these are in fact quite interesting for analyzing
monetary policy rules. These shocks are an example of a foreign disturbances in re-
sponse to which the policy maker has an interest to focus on variables that reﬂect
external economic conditions (consumer price indexes, the interest rate and the ex-
change rate). In addition because they are nominal shocks, they aﬀect real variables
only in the short run, which corresponds to the time horizon for which monetary pol-
icy is eﬀective. Nevertheless, the next subsection outlines the results for other types
of shocks.
5.2 Other shocks
The analysis illustrates in the context of an open economy, in which “home” con-
sumption may diﬀer from production, the existence of a trade-oﬀ in terms of welfare
stabilization through the use of diﬀerent policy rules. This trade oﬀ can be better
resolved with “combination” rules.
On the contrary, if temporary US ﬁscal shocks are taken into account, the best
policy alternative is always to let the money stock remain constant since, in the
short run, neither European consumption nor European output respond to the US
ﬁscal shocks while, in the long run, monetary policy is neutral. If, on the other hand,
permanent European ﬁscal shocks are considered, then there is an additional trade-oﬀ
25between long-run and short-run movements in the real variables.36 Fixing the money
stock produces a larger overshooting/undershooting of output, in the case of "home"
ﬁscal shocks. However, under interest rate targeting there is a short-run change in
consumption, that only occurs in the long-run under a money growth rule, that is,
when the nominal interest rate is kept ﬁxed changes in consumption are anticipated
one period relative to the case where the money stock is kept ﬁxed. Appendix A.6
summarizes these results. In what concerns shocks to the parameters of the model,
only shocks to the coeﬃcient of risk aversion (ρ)o rt h em a r k e ts h a r e( γ) could matter
in answering the questions raised in the context of this model, because the nominal
interest rate does not react to changes in the parameters of monopolistic competition
in the labor market; but no parameter changes were analyzed here.
6 Conclusions
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate whether a monetary policy strategy con-
sisting of multiple intermediate targets (such as money growth and inﬂation) can be
superior to an adoption of a single target, such as inﬂation targeting. Three diﬀer-
ent policies — money growth targeting, interest rate targeting and inﬂation targeting
—w e r ec o m p a r e di nt e r m so ft h e i re ﬀectiveness in mitigating a foreign-induced (i.e.,
US) monetary shock. These alternative policies were ranked according to their ability
to stabilize inﬂation and, alternatively, the utility of consumers. It was shown that,
when the utility of consumers depends on both consumption and leisure, rather than
targeting a single intermediate target, the central bank can achieve a better outcome,
in terms of welfare stabilization, by combining two diﬀerent intermediate targets.
In terms of inﬂation stabilization, the paper conﬁrmed that inﬂation targeting does
achieve the best outcome, while combining inﬂation with the interest rate, or money
growth, or combining money growth with the interest rate all yield somewhat higher
inﬂation variability. Nonetheless, any of these combination policies, while sacriﬁcing
some price stability, may in fact achieve a better outcome in terms of full welfare
stabilization. In order to achieve this outcome, policymakers need to know the un-
derlying parameters of the model (e.g., the degree of risk aversion, the market power
of workers, the intertemporal discount rate, etc.).
However, when uncertainty regarding these parameters is high, a poorly designed
“combination” policy can exacerbate the eﬀect of shocks on consumption and output.
Interestingly, a policy combining the inﬂation rate and the money growth rate does
36Temporary home ﬁscal shocks are uninteresting because the nominal interest rate does not
respond to temporary ﬁscal shocks, and ﬁxing the nominal interest rate is equivalent to ﬁxing the
money stock.
26not require the knowledge of the parameter of risk aversion to guarantee that welfare
is stabilized successfully. Hence, in the context of uncertainty about the model’s
parameters, this combination policy would be preferred on the basis of its simplicity.
This analysis, therefore, contributes toward understanding better some of the trade-
oﬀs faced by policymakers in open economies. In addition, the results provide some
support for the current design of the ECB’s operational framework which could be
interpreted as focusing on two intermediate objectives, money growth and inﬂation,
through the two-pillar strategy. This is because stabilizing money-growth, in addition
to inﬂation, gives an additional degree of freedom to stabilize output. Although
price stability is likely to remain the primary objective of the ECB, as mentioned
before, monetary policy must “without prejudice of price stability (...) support the
general economic policies in the Community...” (Article 2). Hence monitoring money,
under certain assumptions about the shocks hitting the economy, may deliver a better
outcome in terms of output stabilization which should allow the ECB to fulﬁll its
secondary but nonetheless important commitment. Achieving more than one goal
almost always requires more than one intermediate target.
27References
[1] Artis, M. and Currie, D. (1981) “Monetary Targets and the Exchange Rate: A
Case for Conditional Targets”, in Eltis, W. and Sinclair, P. (1981) The Money
Supply and the Exchange Rate, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
[2] Collard, F., Dellas, H. and Ertz, G. (2000), “Poole Revisited”, Centre for Eco-
nomic Policy Research, disussion paper No.2521.
[3] Barro, R. and Gordon, D. (1983) “Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model
of Monetary Policy”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 12 (1), 101-122.
[4] Blanchard, O. and Kiyotaki, N. (1987) “Monopolistic Competition and the Ef-
fects of Aggregate Demand”, American Economic Review, 77 (4), 647-666.
[5] Boyer, R. (1978) “Optimal Foreign Exchange Market Intervention”, Journal of
Political Economy, 86(6), 1046-1055.
[6] Calvo, G. (1983) “Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing framework”, Journal
of Monetary Economics 12(3), 383-398.
[7] Cole, H. and Obstfeld, M. (1991) “Commodity Trade and International Risk
Sharing: How Much do Financial Markets Matter?”, Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics 28 (1991), 3-24.
[8] Corsetti, G. and Presenti, P. (1999) “Welfare and Macroeconomic Interdepen-
dence”, unpublished version (previous version published as NBER wp 6307, Dec
1997, next version forthcoming Quarterly Journal of Economics).
[9] Dixit, A. and Stiglitz, J (1977) “Monopolistic Competition and Optimal Product
Diversity”, American Economic Review, 67, 297-308.
[10] Freeman, C. (1994) “The Use of Indicators and a Monetary Conditions Index in
Canada” in Bank of Canada, Economic Behavior and Policy Choice under Price
Stability, 1994.
[11] Ghironi F. (1998) “U.S.-European Economic Interdependence (I): Positive
Analysis”, unpublished paper.
[12] Obstfeld, M. and Rogoﬀ, K. (1996) Foundations of International Economics,
Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
[13] Obstfeld, M. and Rogoﬀ, K. (1998) “Risk and Exchange Rates”, NBER, wp.6694
[14] Parkin, M. (1978) “A Comparison of Alternative Techniques of Monetary Control
under Rational Expectations”, The Manchester School, 46(3), 252-287.
28[15] Poole, W. (1970) “Optimal Choice of Monetary Policy Instruments in a Simple
Stochastic Macro Model”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, 197-216.
[16] Sargent (1987) Macroeconomic Theory, 2nd ed. Orlando, FL, Academic Press.
[17] Taylor, J. B. (1980) “Aggregate Dynamics and Staggered Contracts”, Journal of
Political Economy, 88 (1), 1-23.
[18] Taylor, J. B. (1993) “Discretion versus policy rules in practice”, Canergie-
Rocehester Conference Series on Public Policy, 39, 195-214.
[19] Woodford, M. (1991), “Currency Competition and the Transition to Monetary
Union: Does Competition Between Currencies Lead to Price Level and Echange
Rate Satbility?”, in Alberto Giovannini and Colin Mayer (eds), European Finan-
cial Integration, Cambridge University Press, 1991.
29A Appendix
A.1 Solving the problem of consumers
The wealth Ωτ−1, consisting of last period’s wage income, lump-sum transfers, cash
balances, and assets plus interest earnings that have not been spent on last period’s
consumption, can be formally written as:
Ω(j)τ−1 ≡
¡
Weu(j)τ−1Leu(j)τ−1 + P
EU
τ−1Teuτ−1
¢
+
¡
M
EU
eu (j)τ−1 + Eτ−1M
EU
us (j)τ−1
¢
+
+
¡
P
EU
τ (1 + reuτ−1)A
EU
eu (j)τ−1 + P
EU
τ (1 + rusτ−1)A
EU
us (j)τ−1
¢
−
−
¡
Peuτ−1C
EU
eu (j)τ−1 + Eτ−1Pusτ−1C
EU
us (j)τ−1
¢
This section shows the conditions needed for deriving the solution of the model,
for the case of Europe. The solution for the case of the US is analogous. Given that
in the optimum the cash-in-advance constraints (4) and the budget constraint (5),
will be binding, the Lagrangian for this problem can be simpliﬁed to the expression
below:
$t =
∞ X
τ=0
β
τ
·
CEU(j)1−ρ
τ
1 − ρ
+ V (Geuτ) −
k
2
Leu(j)
2
τ + λτ(Λeut)
¸
Λeut ≡ (Leu(j)
1− 1
φ
τ−1 Peuτ−1Yτ−1
1
φ + P
EU
τ−1Teuτ−1)+
+
¡
P
EU
τ (1 + reuτ−1)A
EU
eu (j)τ−1 + P
EU
τ (1 + rusτ−1)A
EU
us (j)τ−1
¢
−
−
¡
PeuτC
EU
eu (j)τ + EτPusτC
EU
us (j)τ + P
EU
τ Aeu(j)τ + P
EU
τ Aus(j)τ
¢
which has the following ‘First Order Conditions’ (FOCs):
C
EU(j)
1−ρ
t
γ
PeutCEU
eu (j)t
= λt (38)
C
EU(j)
1−ρ
t
1 − γ
EtPustCEU
us (j)t
= λt (39)
−λt + βλt+1(1 + reut)=0 (40)
−λt + βλt+1(1 + rust)=0 (41)
−kLeu(j)t + βλt+1
φ − 1
φ
Leu(j)
−
1
φ
t PeutYeut
1
φ =0 (42)
Using equations (38) and (39) it is then possible to write that:
γ
PeutCEU
eu (j)t
=
1 − γ
EtPustCUS
us (j)t
30Rearranging this relation yields the following relationships:
P
EU
t C
EU
t = PeutC
EU
eu (j)t + EtPustC
EU
us (j)t =
1
γ
PeutC
EU
eu (j)t =
1
1 − γ
EtPustC
EU
us (j)t
(43)
which can be used together with equation(38) to obtain:
λt = C
EU(j)
−ρ
t
Arbitrage in the asset market determines that reut = rust = rt, for all t. This follows
from satisfying (40) and (41) simultaneously. Substituting λt = CEU(j)
−ρ
t , for all
t, into one of these last equations and into (42) yields, respectively, the usual Euler
equation and a labor-leisure trade-oﬀ:
µ
CEU(j)t+1
CEU(j)t
¶ρ
= β(1 + rt)
Leu(j)t = β
φ − 1
kφ
Leu(j)
−1
φ
t Yeut
1
φ Peut
PEU
t
PEU
t
PEU
t+1
C
EU(j)
−ρ
t+1 =0
Assuming symmetry the index j can drop out and Leu(j)t = Leut = Yeut.I nt h i sc a s e
the conditions for optimality become:
µ
CEU
t+1
CEU
t
¶ρ
= β(1 + rt) (44)
Yeut = βΦ
Peut
PEU
t
PEU
t
PEU
t+1
¡
C
EU
t+1
¢−ρ
(45)
where Φ =
φ − 1
kφ
. Finally the transversality condition for this problem, which ensures
that no wealth is accumulated at time t+τ,w h e nτ tends to inﬁnity, is given below.
lim
τ→∞
1
t+τ Y
s=t+1
(1 + rs)
µ
A
EU
eut+τ + A
EU
ust+τ +
MEU
eut+τ + Et+τMEU
ust+τ
PEU
t+τ
¶
=0
A problem, in all respects analogous to this, is solved by US consumers.
A.2 Model Solutions
Let us ﬁrst characterize the transition period. In this case, the Euler equation pro-
vides a link between the short run, when disturbances occur and the long run when
adjustments have already taken place. From these equations and because arbitrage
31implies that the interest rate in real terms is equalized across the Atlantic, it follows
that the following relation between European and US consumption changes must
hold.
C
EU
CEU =
C
US
CUS (46)
where, as indicated earlier, variables with a bar on top describe the long run and
variables without a bar describe the short run. This condition, rearranged, shows
that the international consumption ratios are the same in the long and in the short
run. In addition, another link between the short run and the long run can be found
in the current accounts for the ﬁrst period of the new steady state:
NFA
EU
=( 1 + reu)NFA
EU +
Peu(Y eu − Geu)
P
EU − C
EU
(47)
NFA
US
= −(1 + rus)NFA
US +
Pus(Yus − Gus)
P US − C
US
(48)
where, assuming that the initial stock of external debt is zero, that is, NFAEU
0 =
NFAEU
0 =0 , the consumption indexes in the short run must satisfy:
C
EU =
Peu(Yeu − Geu)
PEU − NFA
EU C
US =
Pus(Yus − Gus)
P US − NFA
US(49)
C
EU
= δNFA
EU
+
P eu(Y eu − Geu)
P
EU C
US
= δNFA
US
+
Pus(Y us−Gus)
P
US (50)
Substituting C
EU
derived from equation (50) into equation (47) it can be shown that
(1 + δ)NFA
EU
=( 1+reu)NFAEU. Substituting Peu(Yeu − Geu), Pus(Yus − Gus),
Peu(Y eu − Geu) and P us(Y us − Gus) using the market clearing conditions (8), into
equations (49) and (50) and dividing the European by the US current account, yields
the following equilibrium relations:
CEU + NFAEU
CUS + NFAUS =
γ
1 − γ
C
EU
− δNFA
EU
C
US
− δNFA
US =
γ
1 − γ
(51)
Recall that NFAUS
t = −NFAEU
t ,f o ra l lt.G i v e n t h a t (1 + δ)NFA
EU
=( 1 +
reu)NFAEU, equations (51), together with equations (46) imply that NFA
EU
=
NFAEU =0and NFA
US
= NFAUS =0 . Substituting these results into equations
(51) gives the ratios of European to US consumption, in the long run and in the short
run, which are always constant and equal to γ/(1 − γ).
CEU
CUS =
C
EU
C
US =
γ
1 − γ
(52)
32In the case of the model presented here, relaxing the assumption that the initial
external debt is zero could allow temporary shocks, with an impact in the real interest
rate, to induce current account changes, but for simplicity this alternative was not
pursued.37
To help solve the model, it is simpler to deﬁne the following indexes of ﬁscal stance:
geu ≡ Yeu/(Yeu − Geu) and gus ≡ Yus/(Yus − Gus).N o t i c e t h a t geu (gus)i se q u a lt o
one when Geu (Gus) is zero and is increasing in Geu/Yeu (Gus/Yus). In addition deﬁne
also the following world aggregates (xwt) and the following relative indexes (xRt):
xwt ≡ (xeut)
γ(xust)
1−γ xRt ≡ xeut/xust (53)
where xeu can be any of Europe’s variables. Given a variable xeu, xus stands for its US
analogue. Notice that xeut =( xRt)1−γxwt and xust =( xRt)−γxwt. In what concerns the
parameters of the model, for any parameters α (referring to the European economy)
and α∗ (referring to the US economy), similar aggregates will be deﬁned whenever it
is convenient, such that: αw ≡ (α)γ(α∗)1−γ and αRt ≡ α/α∗.
Now it is possible to solve for the long-run equilibrium in this model. First recall
the goods market clearing conditions (8). In the long run these conditions become:
P eu(Y eu − Geu)
P
EU = γ(C
EU
+ C
US
)
P us(Y us − Gus)
P
US =( 1− γ)(C
EU
+ C
US
)
Substituting C
US
=
1 − γ
γ
C
EU
in the European goods market equilibrium and C
EU
=
γ
1 − γ
C
US
in the US goods market equilibrium and substituting (Y eu − Geu) by
Y eu/geu and (Y us − Gus) by Y us/gus, according to the notation introduced before,
yields:
PeuY eu
P
EU
geu
= C
EU PusY us
P
US
gus
= C
US
(54)
Replacing these results in the long-run versions of the quality-theory-of-money equa-
tions (10), gives the equilibrium locus MC, providing a relationship between the real
stock of money and consumption:
MC :
Meu
P
EU =
Peu
P
EU
Y eu
geu
⇒
Meu
P
EU = C
EU
(55)
37See Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996) for evidence that this is the case.
33and analogously for the US:
Mus
P
US =
P us
P
US
Y us
gus
⇒
Mus
P
US = C
US
(56)
Notice that, using (52) and dividing the two previous relations gives a solution for the
long-run exchange rate in terms of the relative money supplies, because PPP holds
for the aggregate price indexes:
M
EU
/P
EU
M
US
/P
US =
C
EU
C
US ⇒ E =
1 − γ
γ
MR (57)
In the long run, both the labor-leisure trade oﬀ and the goods market equilibrium will
be binding in the two economies. These two relations determine two other equilibrium
loci relationships between consumption and output, YC 1 and YC 2, which are enough
to determine the long-run levels for these variables in Europe and in the US. In the
long run, money will have no eﬀect on consumption and output. It will not have an
eﬀect on the terms of trade either. This can be observed by dividing both the goods
market equilibrium equations derived in (54) and by using PPP again, in order to
obtain equation (58):
P eu
EP us
=
gR
Y R
γ
1 − γ
(58)
The ﬁrst of the the loci relating consumption and output is derived from the goods
market equilibrium conditions alone. To ﬁnd this equilibrium schedule, notice that,
by deﬁnition of the price index is equal to:
P
EU
P eu
=
1
γw
µ
EP us
P eu
¶1−γ
(59)
Substituting the terms of trade by the expression given in equation (58) and substitut-
ing the resulting expression for P
EU
/Peu into the European goods market equilibrium
given by equation (54), yields:
Y eu =
1
γw
µ
Y R
gR
1 − γ
γ
¶1−γ
geuC
EU
(60)
The ratio gR/Y R can now be calculated by dividing the long-run European labor-
leisure trade-oﬀby its US analogue, which can be obtained from (45), letting P
j
t /P
j
t+1 =
1, j = EU,US and substituting all variables zt by their long-run values z.
Y eu = βΦ
P eu
P EU
³
C
EU´−ρ
Y us = βΦ
∗ Pus
P
US
³
C
US´−ρ
34Notice that substituting
³
Peu/P
EU´
and
³
Pus/P
US´
, using equations (54), yields:
Y eu = βΦ
³
C
EU´1−ρ geu
Y eu
Y us = βΦ
∗
³
C
US´1−ρ gus
Yus
Dividing now both equations, substituting CR by
γ
1 − γ
and rearranging them gives
gR/Y R:
Y R
gR
=( ΦR)
1
2
µ
γ
1 − γ
¶ 1−ρ
2
(gR)
−1
2 (61)
Introducing this result in equation (60) gives the locus YC 1:
YC 1 : Y eu =
(ΦR)
1−γ
2
γw
µ
γ
1 − γ
¶−
(1−γ)(1+ρ)
2
(gus)
1−γ
2 (geu)
1+γ
2 C
EU
(62)
According to this equation, when European agents increase their consumption, the
demand for European goods increases proportionally. Additionally, the eﬀects of ﬁscal
expansions in Europe and in the US diﬀer. A ﬁscal expansion in the US improves
Europe’s terms of trade, shifting demand towards European goods, while a ﬁscal
expansion at home has two opposite eﬀects: it directly increases demand for European
goods, on the one hand, but on the other hand it worsens Europe’s terms of trade and,
therefore shifts some demand towards US goods. Here the ﬁrst eﬀect is dominant.
The second schedule can be obtained by calculating world output from the labor
leisure trade-oﬀs:
Y w =
µ
βΦ
Peu
P
EU
³
C
EU´−ρ¶γ µ
βΦ
∗ P us
P
US
³
C
US´−ρ¶1−γ
(63)
=
Ã
βΦγw
µ
P eu
EPus
¶1−γ ³
C
EU´−ρ
!γ Ã
βΦ
∗γw
µ
EP us
P eu
¶γ ³
C
EU´−ρ
!1−γ
⇒ Y w = βΦwγw
¡
Cw
¢−ρ
where Cw =
³
C
EU´γ ³
C
US´1−γ
.R e p l a c i n g C
EU
and C
US
using equations (54)
35yields:
Cw =
Ã
PeuY eu
P
EU
geu
!γ Ã
PusY us
P
US
gus
!1−γ
=
Ã
P us(P
EU
/P
US
)
Peu
geu/gus
Y eu/Y us
!1−γ
C
EU
=
µ
EPeu
Pus
gR
Y R
¶1−γ
C
EU
Using now equation (58) to substitute for the term in brackets, allows to write:
Cw =
µ
1 − γ
γ
¶1−γ
C
EU
(64)
It is also possible to calculate Y eu using the fact that Y eu =( Y R)1−γY w, by substi-
tuting the solutions for Y R and Y w from equations (61) and (63) respectively:
Y eu =
Ã
(ΦR)
1/2
µ
γ
1 − γ
¶ 1+ρ
2
(gR)
1
2
!1−γ
βΦwγw(Cw)
−ρ
Substituting Cw from equation (64) and rearranging yields the locus YC 2:
YC 2 : Y eu = γw(ΦR)
1−γ
2 βΦw
µ
γ
1 − γ
¶(1+ρ)(1−γ)
2
(gR)
1−γ
2 (C
EU
)
−ρ (65)
Here an increase in long-run consumption decreases the marginal beneﬁtf r o mc o n -
suming, such that agents prefer to work less, reducing output. On the other hand, a
ﬁscal expansion (contraction) in Europe (in the US) results in an appreciation of the
home currency, accompanied by an increase in real wages which creates incentives for
consumers to supply more labor. Equations (62) and (65) form a system of two equa-
tions which can be solved for Y and C in terms of the parameters and the monetary
and ﬁscal stances:
(62) = (65) ⇒
³
C
EU´1+ρ
=
µ
γ
1 − γ
¶(1+ρ)(1−γ)
(γw)
2βΦw(gw)
−1
⇒ C
EU
=
µ
γ
1 − γ
¶(1−γ)
(γw)
2
1+ρ(βΦw)
1
1+ρ(gw)
− 1
1+ρ
Deﬁning Γ =( γ/(1 − γ))
(1−γ) γ
2
1+ρ
w and ac = Γ(Φw)
1
1+ρ gives equation (11) in the
36text. Substituting now C in equation (62):
Y eu =
(ΦR)
1−γ
2
γw
µ
γ
1 − γ
¶−
(1−γ)(1+ρ)
2
(gus)
1−γ
2 (geu)
1+γ
2
µ
γ
1 − γ
¶(1−γ)
(γw)
2
1+ρ(βΦw)
1
1+ρ(gw)
− 1
1+ρ
⇒ Y eu =
µ
γ
1 − γ
¶−
(1−γ)(1+ρ−2)
2
(γw)
( 2
1+ρ−1)Φ
1
2(Φw)
( 1
1+ρ−1
2)β
1
1+ρ(geu)
1
2(gw)
(−1
2− 1
1+ρ)
⇒ Y eu =
µ
γ
1 − γ
¶(1−γ)(1−ρ)
2
(γw)
1−ρ
1+ρΦ
1
2(Φw)
1−ρ
2(1+ρ)β
1
1+ρ(geu)
1
2(gw)
− 1−ρ
2(1+ρ)
Simplifying according to the notation introduced before yields:
Y eu = Γ
1−ρ
2 Φ
1
2(Φw)
1−ρ
2(1+ρ)β
1
1+ρ(geu)
1
2(gw)
−
1−ρ
2(1+ρ)
Deﬁning now the parameter ay ≡ Γ
1−ρ
2 Φ
1
2(Φw)
1−ρ
2(1+ρ) allows one to obtain equation (12)
in the main text. From the money demand equation given by the cash-in-advance
constraint we can also write:
Meu
P
EU = acβ
1
1+ρ(gw)
− 1
1+ρ
Rearranging this expression gives the same solution for the long-run European price
index as given by equation (13). Using equation (58) in the main text and equation
(61) it is now possible to derive the solution for the terms of trade:
EPus
P eu
=
1 − γ
γ
(ΦR)
1
2
µ
γ
1 − γ
¶1−ρ
2
(gR)
−1
2
⇒
EP us
P eu
=( ΦR)
1
2
µ
γ
1 − γ
¶−
1+ρ
2
(gR)
−1
2
Deﬁning also ap ≡ (ΦR)
1
2 (γ/(1 − γ))
−
1+ρ
2 gives the solution (16) in the main text.
The expression for the long-run price of the home good can be found through the
relation (59):
Peu = γw
Ã
(ΦR)
−1
2
µ
γ
1 − γ
¶1+ρ
2
(gR)
1
2
!1−γ
P
EU
Peu = γw(ΦR)
−
1−γ
2
µ
γ
1 − γ
¶ (1+ρ)(1−γ)
2
(gR)
1−γ
2 (ac)
−1β
− 1
1+ρ(gw)
1
1+ρMeu
PH =( ac)
ρayΦ
−1(ac)
−1β
− 1
1+ρ(g)
1
2(gw)
1−ρ
2(1+ρ)Meu
37In the short-run, however, during the period when prices remain ﬁxed, consump-
tion levels are simply determined by the cash-in-advance constraints, and therefore
by the short-run analogue of the locus (55), such that:
C
EU =
Meu
PEU (66)
where PEU is determined by the trading prices of goods and by the relative short-run
money supplies, since the result E =
1 − γ
γ
MR, also holds in the short run.38 Because
the prices of goods do not adjust, during this period, they remain equal to their initial
levels which correspond to the initial steady state solution. Therefore, Peu = Peu0
and Pus = Pus0,w h e r eP eu0 and P us0 a r eg i v e nb yt h es a m ee x p r e s s i o n sa sPeu and
Pus,w i t ht h eﬁscal and monetary stances at the initial levels geu0, gus0, Meu0, Mus0
and with the exchange rate given by E0 =
1 − γ
γ
MR0, such that:
Peu =( ac)
ρ−1ayΦ
−1β
− 1
1+ρ(geu0)
1
2(gw0)
1−ρ
2(1+ρ)Meu0 (67)
Pus = ap(gR0)
−1
2Peu
γ
1 − γ
(MR0)
−1 (68)
To obtain the European price index from these equations, notice that:
(Peu)
γ
µ
1 − γ
γ
Pus
¶1−γ
= β
− 1
1+ρ(ac)
ρ−1ayΦ
−1(ap)
1−γ(gw0)
1
1+ρMw0 (69)
Substituting this expression into the deﬁnition of the short-run price gives:
P
EU =
1
γw
β
− 1
1+ρ(ac)
ρ−1ayΦ
−1(ap)
1−γ(gw0)
1
1+ρMw0(MR)
1−γ
Notice that, since ay =( ac)
1−ρ
2 Φ
1
2 and γ−1
w (ap)(1−γ) =( ac)−
1+ρ
2 Φ
1
2, the previous ex-
pression can be simpliﬁed to yield the solution (19). Substituting that solution into
(66) allows to write home consumption as a function of the world money supply as
in equation (17). Output for the short run can be obtained from the home good
market equilibrium. Recall that the home goods market equilibrium gives output as
a function of (P EU/Peu), CEU and geu.
PeuYeu
PEUgeu
= C
EU ⇒ Yeu =
PEU
Peu
geuC
EU (70)
38This result can be found again by dividing the cash-in-advance constraints of both countries in
the short-run and by substituting CEU =
γ
1 − γ
CUS.
38Dividing (19) by (67) allows to write (PEU/Peu) as follows:
PEU
Peu
=
(ac)−1β
− 1
1+ρ (gw0)
1
1+ρ Mw0 (MR)
1−γ
(ac)ρ−1ayΦ−1β
− 1
1+ρ (geu0)
1
2 (gw0)
1−ρ
2(1+ρ) Meu0
⇒
P EU
Peu
=( ac)
−ρ
(ay)
−1Φ
1 (geu0)
−1
2 (gw0)
1
2
µ
MR
MR0
¶1−γ
Substituting this result into equation (70) and substituting CEU by the result found
in equation (17) yields:
Yeu =( ac)
1−ρ(ay)
−1Φβ
1
1+ρ (geu0)
−1
2 (gw0)
−
1−ρ
2(1+ρ) geu
Meu
Meu0
⇒ Yeu =( ac)
1−ρ(ay)
−1Φβ
1
1+ρ (geu0)
1
2 (gw0)
−
1−ρ
2(1+ρ) Meu
Meu0
geu
geu0
Notice now that (a4)1−ρΦ =( a5)2, hence the previous expression can be simpliﬁed to
yield the solution for the short-run level of European output, shown in equation (18)
in the main text.Solutions in all respects analogous to these can be found for the case
of the US, but will be omitted here for simplicity of exposition.
A.3 Inﬂation Variation
Under inﬂation targeting, price changes are zero, but under both money growth tar-
geting and interest rate prices will change in response to shocks. Under money growth
targeting, the aggregate price index changes in the short-run and this eﬀect is oﬀset
by an opposite move in prices in the long-run. Under nominal interest rate targeting
prices change only in the short run and this eﬀect is not reversed. Overall the total
price variability can be compared using useful log-linearizations:
P EU
P
EU
0
− 1=πM ' ln(1 + πM)=−(1 − γ)ln
µ
Mus
Mus0
¶
P
EU
P EU − 1=πM ' ln(1 + πM)=( 1− γ)ln
µ
Mus
Mus0
¶ (71)
P EU
P
EU
0
− 1=πi ' ln(1 + πi)=−
1−γ
γ ln
µ
Mus
Mus0
¶
P
EU
P EU = πi ' ln(1 + πi)=0
(72)
Using expressions (71) and (72) it is possible to derive the inﬂation variability under
both regimes, such that:
V [ln(1+πM)] =
·
−(1 − γ)ln
µ
Mus
Mus0
¶¸2
+
·
(1 − γ)ln
µ
Mus
Mus0
¶¸
=2 ( 1 −γ)
2
·
ln
µ
Mus
Mus0
¶¸2
39V [ln(1 + πi)] =
·
−
1 − γ
γ
ln
µ
Mus
Mus0
¶¸2
=
µ
1 − γ
γ
¶2 ·
ln
µ
Mus
Mus0
¶¸2
Comparing the two expression we can conclude that:
V [ln(1 + πM)] <V[ln(1 + πi)] =⇒ γ<
1
√
2
A.4 The Welfare Analysis
The welfare analysis is based on minimizing deviations in the utility of European
consumers. In order to determine an expression for this variation in terms of policy
variables, deﬁne the steady-state level of the intertemporal utility function, excluding
utility from public spending as e UEU
0 ,s u c ht h a t : 39
e U
EU
0 =
1
1 − β
e u
EU
0
where e uEU
0 =( 1− ρ)
−1 ¡
CEU
0
¢1−ρ−K/2(Yeu0)
2. After the shock, since in the long-run
consumption and output are not aﬀected by monetary shocks and are equal to their
initial levels, e U becomes:
e U
EU = e u
EU
0 + βe u
EU +
β
2
1 − β
e u
EU
0
where e uEU =( 1− ρ)
−1 ¡
CEU
0
¢1−ρ − K/2(Yeu)
2. Notice that the diﬀerence between
e UEU and e UEU
0 is simply:
e U
EU − e U
EU
0 = β
¡
e u
EU − e u
EU
0
¢
(73)
Substituting now e uEU
0 and e uEU gives:
U − U0 = β
Ã¡
CEU¢1−ρ −
¡
CEU
0
¢1−ρ
1 − ρ
−
K
2
¡
(Yeu)
2 − (Yeu0)
2¢
!
Substituting now CEU and Yeu by their short-run solutions (17) and (18) respectively
and rearranging yields:
U − U0 = β
Ã
C
1−ρ
0
1 − ρ
"µ
Mw
Mw0
¶1−ρ
− 1
#
−
K
2
Y
2
0
"µ
M
M0
¶2 µ
g
g0
¶2
− 1
#!
' β
µ
C
1−ρ
0 ln
µ
Mw
Mw0
¶
− KY
2
0
·
ln
µ
M
M0
¶
+l n
µ
g
g0
¶¸¶
using x ' ln(x +1 ) .W h e ng = g0, the loss function Leu = E
£
(U − U0)
2¤
is given by
expression (32) in the text.
39The utility from public spending is additively separable and will be the same under the two
policy rules, therefore it will not aﬀect the ranking of the policy regimes.
40A.5 Deriving the Optimal Combinations:
In the case of a “Poole” type of policy, combining the nominal interest rate and the
money growth rate, the parameter a determines the optimal relationship between the
variables. In order to obtain a solution for a which minimizes the loss function notice
that, for any α, according to equation (23), the combination policy implies that:
µ
Meu
Meu0
¶
=
µ
Mus
Mus0
¶−
(1−γ)(ρ−1)(1−α)
α+γ(ρ−1)(1−α) Mw
Mw0
=
µ
Mus
Mus0
¶ α(1−γ)
α+γ(ρ−1)(1−α)
In addition, for any value of α, there is a corresponding loss function of the form:
Li/M|eu =( β(1 − γ))
2
Ã
α(CEU
0 )1−ρ +( 1− α)(ρ − 1)K (Yeu0)
2
α + γ(ρ − 1)(1 − α)
!2
σ
2
Mus
Notice that there is a value of the parameter α for which the loss function is zero for
any value of σ2
Mus,w h i c hi sg i v e nb y :
α(C
EU
0 )
1−ρ +( 1− α)(ρ − 1)K (Yeu0)
2 =0 ; α + γ(ρ − 1)(1 − α) 6=0
⇒ α =
(ρ − 1)
(ρ − 1) − ξeu
; ξeu 6=
1
γ
where ξeu,i sd e ﬁn e da sbe f o r ei n( 3 4 ) .I fξeu =1 /γ,t h a ti s ,i fK (Yeu0)
2 = γ(CEU
0 )1−ρ =
 ∗, for any value α, including 0 and 1, the loss will be always equal to
³
1−γ
γ β ∗
´2
σ2
Mus.
Similarly, in the case of a “two-pillar policy with the nominal interest rate”, for
any value of the parameter απi, which determines in this case the relationship to be
maintained between inﬂation and the nominal interest rate, the loss function will be
given by:40
Li/π|eu = β
2
Ã
απi
¡
CEU
0
¢1−ρ − (απi +( 1− ρ)(1− απi))K (Yeu0)
2
απi +
γ
1−γ (ρ − 1)(1 − απi)
!2
σ
2
Mus
This combination policy allows to insulate the economy from the US monetary dis-
turbance when απi is chosen, such that the expression in brackets takes the value
zero. In this case, the value of απi which produces that result must satisfy:
απi
¡
CEU
0
¢1−ρ −(απi−(ρ − 1)(1 − απi))K (Yeu0)
2 =0 ; απi+
γ
1−γ (ρ − 1)(1 − απi)6=0
⇒ απi =
ρ − 1
ρ − ξeu
; ξeu 6=
1
γ
40Under this rule: Meu
Meu0 =
³
Mus
Mus0
´ απi+(1−ρ)(1−απi)
απi−
γ
1−γ (1−ρ)(1−απi)
41When ξeu =1 /γ,t h a ti s ,w h e nK (Yeu0)
2 = γ(CEU
0 )1−ρ =  ∗, for any value α the loss
will be always equal to
³
1−γ
γ β ∗
´2
σ2
Mus.41
Analogously, in the case of a “two-pillar policy with the money growth rate”t h e
relationship between inﬂation and the money growth rate is determined by απM.F o r
any απM the central bank’s loss function takes the form:42
LM/π|eu = β
2
Ã
(1 − γ)(2απM − 1)
¡
CEU
0
¢1−ρ − (1 − γ)απMK (Yeu0)
2
(2 − γ)απM − 1
!2
σ
2
Mus
In this case, the value of the parameter determining the combination that allows to
insulate the economy from the US monetary shocks is the one which satisﬁes:
(1 − γ)(2απM − 1)
¡
CEU
0
¢1−ρ − (1 − γ)απMK (Yeu0)
2 =0 ;( 2− γ)απM − 1 6=0
⇒ απM =
ξeu
2ξeu − 1
;ξeu 6=
1
γ
Recall that ξeu =
φ
(φ−1)
1
β(geu0) and observe that this policy rule requires less information
about the parameters, in particular, it requires no knowledge of the parameter of risk
aversion ρ.W h e nξeu =1 /γ,t h a ti s ,w h e nK (Yeu0)
2 = γ(CEU
0 )1−ρ =  ∗, the loss is,
once more, equal to
³
1−γ
γ β ∗
´2
σ2
Mus,f o ra n yαπM.
For the rules using the exchange rate as a policy variable the solutions for the
optimal policy parameters are obtained as in the previous cases. Under the MCI rule,
for instance, for any αMCI, the loss function can be written as:
Li/E|eu = β
2
µ
αMCIC
1−ρ
0 − (αMCI + γ(ρ − 1)(1 − αMCI) − (ρ − 1)(1 − αMCI))KY 2
0
αMCI + γ(ρ − 1)(1 − αMCI)
¶2
σ
2
Mus
The MCI policy allows to insulate the economy from the US monetary disturbance
provided that the parameter αMCI is chosen, such that the expression in brackets
takes the value zero, which in this case occurs when αMCI satisﬁes:43
αMCIC
1−ρ
0 −(αMCI−(1 − γ)(ρ − 1)(1 − αMCI))KY
2
0=0 ; αMCI+γ(ρ − 1)(1 − αMCI) 6=0
⇒ αMCI =
(1 − γ)(ρ − 1)
(1 + (1 − γ)(ρ − 1)) − ξeu
; ξeu 6=
1
γ
41Recall that ξeu =
(C
EU
0 )(1−ρ)
k(Y eu0)2 =
φ
(φ−1)
1
β(g0)
42Under this rule Meu
Meu0 =
³
Mus
Mus0
´ απM(1−γ)
απM(2−γ)−1.
43Again when ξeu =1 /γ,t h a ti s ,w h e nK (Yeu0)
2 = γ(CEU
0 )1−ρ =  ∗, for any value αMCI the
loss will be always equal to
³
1−γ
γ β ∗
´2
σ2
Mus.
42I nt h ec a s eo ft h eIMI rule, for any αIMI,“ two-pillar policy with the nominal interest
rate”the central bank’s loss function can be written as:
LM/E|eu = β
2
Ã
(2αIMI − 1+γ(1 − αIMI))
¡
CEU
0
¢1−ρ − αIMIK (Yeu0)
2
2αIMI − 1
!2
σ
2
Mus
The value of αIMI that allows the economy to be insulated from US monetary shocks
must therefore satisfy:44
(2αIMI − 1+γ(1 − αIMI))C
1−ρ
0 − αIMIKY 2
0 =0 ; αIMI 6=1 /2
αIMI =
(1 − γ)ξeu
(2 − γ)ξeu − 1
;ξeu 6=
1
γ
A.6 Analysis of European Fiscal Shocks
This appendix shows the eﬀects on consumption and output when (i) a ﬁxed money
supply rule or (ii) a ﬁxed interest rate rule are used to stabilize permanent domestic
ﬁscal shocks.
(i) Under a constant money supply rule the impact of a permanent domestic ﬁscal
shock geu/geu0 on consumption and output, in the short run and in the long run
(respectively) will be equal to:
C
EU = C
EU
0
Yeu = Y eu0
geu
geu0
C
EU
= C
EU
0
µ
geu
geu0
¶−
γ
1+ρ
Y eu = Y eu0
µ
geu
geu0
¶1−
(1+γ)+(1−γ)ρ
2(1+ρ)
(i) Under a constant nominal interest rate rule the impact of a permanent domestic
ﬁscal shock geu/geu0 on consumption and output, in the short run and in the long run
(respectively) is given by:
C
EU = C
EU
0
µ
geu
geu0
¶−
γ
1+ρ
Yeu = Y eu0
µ
geu
geu0
¶ ρ
1+ρ
44When ξeu =1 /γ,t h a ti s ,w h e nK (Yeu0)
2 = γ(CEU
0 )1−ρ =  ∗, the loss is, once more, equal to ³
1−γ
γ β ∗
´2
σ2
Mus, for any αIMI.
43C
EU
= C
EU
Y eu = Y eu0
µ
geu
geu0
¶ ρ
1+ρ−
(1−γ)(ρ−1)
2(1+ρ)
= Y eu0
µ
geu
geu0
¶1−
(1+γ)+(1−γ)ρ
2(1+ρ)
Other Shocks:
Foreign Permanent Fiscal shocks: only aﬀect the long run and monetary policy is
neutral in the long run. Other shocks: the nominal interest rate reacts only to γ and
ρ.
44ABOUT CEPS
ounded in 1983, the  Centre for European Policy Studies is an independent policy research
institute dedicated to producing sound policy research leading to constructive solutions to the
challenges facing Europe today. Funding is obtained from membership fees, contributions from
official institutions (European Commission, other international and multilateral institutions, and
national bodies), foundation grants, project research, conferences fees and publication sales.
GOALS
•  To achieve high standards of academic excellence and maintain unqualified independence.
•  To provide a forum for discussion among all stakeholders in the European policy process.
•  To build collaborative networks of researchers, policy-makers and business across the whole of
Europe.
•  To disseminate our findings and views through a regular flow of publications and public events.
ASSETS AND ACHIEVEMENTS
•  Quality research by an international staff of 30 drawn from fifteen countries.
•  An extensive network of external collaborators, including some 35 senior associates with
extensive experience working in EU affairs.
•  Complete independence to set its own priorities and freedom from any outside influence.
•  Ability to anticipate trends and to analyse policy questions well before they become topics of
general public discussion.
  PROGRAMME STRUCTURE
CEPS is a place where creative and authoritative specialists reflect and comment on the problems and
opportunities facing Europe today. This is evidenced by the depth and originality of its publications
and the talent and prescience of its expanding research staff. The CEPS research programme is
organised under two major headings:
Economic Policy
Macroeconomic Policy
European Network of Economic Policy
       Research Institutes (ENEPRI)
Financial Markets and Institutions
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI)
Trade Developments and Policy
Energy for the 21
st Century
Efficiency in the Pursuit of Collective Goals
Politics, Institutions and Security
Political Institutions and Society
The Wider Europe
South East Europe
Caucasus and Black Sea
EU-Russian Relations
The CEPS-IISS Security Forum
South East European Security Cooperation
Justice and Home Affairs
In addition to these two sets of research programmes, the Centre organises a variety of activities
within the CEPS Policy Forum. These include CEPS working parties, the lunchtime membership
meetings, network meetings abroad, board-level briefings for CEPS corporate members, conferences,
training seminars, major annual events (e.g. the CEPS International Advisory Council) and internet
and media relations.
Centre for European Policy Studies
1 Place du Congrès
1000 Brussels, Belgium
Tel: 32(0)2.229.39.11   Fax: 32(0)2.219.41.51
E-mail: info@ceps.be    Website: http://www.ceps.be
F